No one should be against Better Regulation, although there a quite a few officials who may not like it.
On 7 July 2022, the European Parliament adopted a report prepared by Tiemo WÖLKEN (S&D/Germany) on ‘Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws ‘.
It provides some good suggestions. I hope the Commission reads the EP’s Report and takes on board the recommendations.
The report is thoughtful and, if applied, will improve things.
I sense that this Commission has put Better Regulation on the back-burner in their zeal to meet their self-imposed legislative timetable. When proposals get adopted on evidence that amounts to “they are popular”, we have moved way beyond the original intent of Better Regulation. I hope I am wrong.
It could have spoken more about secondary legislation – 97% of all EU legislation and public access. Many Commission Departments still pass important laws through Committees which fall foul of any basic concepts of open and transparent law-making.
My highlights
- Calls on the Commission to perform impact assessments on all legislative proposals, without exception (Para 42) – this is not happening today.
- Asks ‘the Commission should carry out impact assessments of its legislative and non-legislative initiatives, delegated acts and implementing measures that are expected to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts’ (Para 47) – this is not happening today.
- Calls for ‘restrictions on access to documents, particularly legislative documents, should be exceptional and limited to what is absolutely necessary’ (Para 62), which is not happening today.
- Wants to ensure the Regulatory Scrutiny Board’s independence is preserved (Para 82)
- Wants the RSB’s opinion to be made available when adopted and not as is the practice today when the Commission’s proposal is published – ‘calls on the Commission to publish all of the Board’s opinions immediately after adoption, without any exception, in order to ensure coherence, transparency and accountability throughout the process, and also to deliver them to Parliament and the Council’ (Para 82)
______________________________________________
References below
42. Calls on the Commission to perform impact assessments on all legislative proposals, without exception; deeply regrets that this was not the case for several politically sensitive proposals in the past; recalls that on several occasions Parliament has carried out its own impact assessments in replacement of the Commission’s in order to inform policy-making; calls for a sufficient amount of time and resources to be allocated to impact assessments in order to ensure their quality; nevertheless, recalls that impact assessments help to inform political decision-making, but should never replace or unduly delay the legislative process; highlights, however, that the main focus during the EU’s legislative process should be on quality, transparency and state-of-the-art knowledge and data in the impact assessments and not on the speed at which initiatives are completed; calls for impact assessments to be published immediately upon their completion, and not only when the policy proposal is presented, thus ensuring greater transparency on how EU decisions are taken; acknowledges that the effective implementation of better regulation and, in particular, of the ex ante impact assessments will require an appropriate level of resources; urges the Commission to allocate the appropriate means in this regard;
47. Expresses concerns about the implementation of the provisions of the European Climate Law in cases where no impact assessment is performed, especially for politically sensitive proposals, including secondary legislation; recalls that, as agreed under the IIA, the Commission should carry out impact assessments of its legislative and non-legislative initiatives, delegated acts and implementing measures that are expected to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts;
62. Recalls that transparency and publicity in relation to an ongoing legislative procedure are inherent to the legislative process and can therefore be applied to access to documents for trilogues as stated by the CJEU in its case-law, in case T-540/15, Emilio De Capitani v European Parliament in particular; believes that the EU needs to develop a more ambitious access to documents policy and provide for better application of the existing rules, including for documents related to internal, trilogue and international negotiations; recalls that, according to the European Ombudsman, restrictions on access to documents, particularly legislative documents, should be exceptional and limited to what is absolutely necessary; adds, furthermore, that openness and transparency confer greater legitimacy on and confidence in the democratic legislative process of the EU; regrets the practice whereby ‘efficiency of the institution’s decision-making process’ is routinely invoked to refuse access to legislative preparatory documents;
82. Takes note of the involvement of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in impact assessments, fitness checks, and major evaluations of current legislation, which improves the evidence-based work of the Commission; notes that the Regulatory Scrutiny Board can play a role in ensuring an unbiased and high-quality level of work from the Commission and that its expertise and experience could be used to carry out other tasks within the Commission; stresses that the Regulatory Scrutiny Board can only provide an effective check on the Commission’s work if its independence and impartiality are indisputably established; calls, in this regard, for the independence of the board and for the transparency of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on meetings with stakeholders, reviews, recommendations and opinions to be significantly improved, including through making the use of the Transparency Register mandatory for members of the Board; underlines that the work of the Board should not ultimately affect the Commission’s capacity to propose legislation or unduly delay the adoption of legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to publish all of the Board’s opinions immediately after adoption, without any exception, in order to ensure coherence, transparency and accountability throughout the process, and also to deliver them to Parliament and the Council; further calls on the Commission also to make the draft evaluations and draft impact assessments that are submitted to the board available to the co-legislators; takes note that the Regulatory Scrutiny Board is composed of four members of the Commission and three external experts; calls on the Commission to reconsider the decision-making process of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, as the current system allows opinions to be adopted without the input of external experts or to establish an independent Regulatory Scrutiny Board outside the Commission; further calls on the Commission to extend its collaboration with the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, strengthening it by providing more means for it to do its work and to ensure support from the Joint Research Centre;